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BRENNAN v. ILLINOIS RACING BOARD: THE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES MAKING A HORSE
TRAINER THE ABSOLUTE INSURER FOR
THE CONDITION OF HIS HORSE
In Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board,' the Illinois Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a statute2 making a horse trainer
the absolute insurer of, and responsible for, the condition of his
horse if the horse is found to have any drugs, narcotics or stimu-
lants in his system on the day the horse races. This decision fo-
cuses attention on the conflict which exists among the states as
to the validity of these "trainer insurer" rules.' This Note will
1. Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 42 Ill. 2d 352, 247 N.E.2d 881 (1969).
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 37c-3 (1966):
The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and be responsible
for the condition of horses entered by him in a race regardless of
the acts of a third party. Should chemical or other analysis of
saliva or urine samples, or other tests, show the presence of any
drug of any kind or description, the Board may in its discretion
suspend or revoke the license of the trainer, the stable foreman
in charge of the horse, the groom, or any other person shown to
have had the care or attendance of the horse.
3. A similar statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Florida
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 159 Fla. 165, 31 So. 2d
627 (1947).
Trainer insurer rules have been held valid in California, Sandstrom
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189 P.2d 17 (1948); New
Mexico, Sanderson v. New Mexico State Racing Comm'n., 80 N.M. 200, 453
P.2d 370 (1969); and West Virginia, State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n., 133 W. Va. 179, 55 S.E. 2d 263 (1949).
Ohio has a "trainer insurer" rule, but the Supreme Court of Ohio,
Battles v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 12 Ohio App. 2d 52, 230 N.E.2d 662
(1967), while holding that the insurer rule was not unconstitutional in
its general application, stated that it could be ruled invalid as to a particular
set of circumstances, so that in effect, the court rejected the absolute lia-
bility interpretation.
analyze the decision of the Brennan case in light of contrary deci-
sions in other jurisdictions as to the validity of the "trainer in-
surer" rules and in relation to other areas of absolute liability.
Jean Brennan was the trainer of a horse which, having won a
race, was subjected to a urinalysis pursuant to the racing regula-
tions. A stimulant, prohibited by the Illinois Racing Board's Rules
of Racing, was found in the urine sample. The Racing Board re-
voked Brennan's trainer's license for a violation of the rules.
Brennan appealed the revocation, and was successful in having
the revocation order set aside by the Circuit Court of Cook County
on the grounds that the rule under which his license was revoked
was arbitrary, unreasonable and deprived him of due process of
the law.
On appeal by the State Racing Board, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the "trainer insurer" rule was arbi-
trary, unreasonable and an illegitimate exercise of police power.
The court stated that the rule prevented the horse trainer from
making a defense to the charge against him by substituting an
irrebuttable presumption which unjustly destroyed his right to of-
fer evidence to establish his innocence.
4
BACKGROUND
Millions of dollars are involved in the legalized gambling which
is attendant upon horse racing.5 The states receive a portion of
this amount in tax revenues. 6 In addition, an untold amount of
money is involved in illegal, off-track gambling. The wagering
public has a substantial interest in horse racing. They are betting
money on the outcome of the races under the assumption that the
races are being conducted fairly and honestly. If the public has
doubts about the fairness and honesty with which the races are
conducted, their willingness to risk money will decrease. Of more
importance, those persons who had wagered on the horse which
is eventually declared the winner as a result of the disqualification
of the drugged horse will not be able to obtain either a refund
of the money they wagered or the money they would have won
had not the original "winner" been drugged. The state also has
a substantial interest in horse racing, for if the amount of wagering
decreases because of the public's lack of confidence in the manner
in which the races are conducted, the tax revenues received by
the state will decrease proportionately. For these reasons, close
regulatory supervision of horse racing is necessary and appropriate.
Those charged with the supervision of the races must not only
4. Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 42 Ill. 2d 352, 355, 247 N.E.2d 881,
884 (1969).
5. The pari-mutuel turnover for 1966 was $4,685,000,000. U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1967,
at 213 (88th ed. 1967).
6. The revenue to the states for 1966 was $388,000,000. Id.
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concern themselves with the actions of the horse owners, trainers,
jockeys and others involved in the racing, but they must also
concern themselves with the actions of other persons who would
desire to control the outcome of the races. It is to this end that
the "trainer insurer" rules have been enacted. 7 Under the "trainer
insurer" rules, the trainer is not only responsible for his own ac-
tions and the actions of his employees, but also for the actions of
third persons.8 It is this portion of the rules making the trainer
liable for the acts of third parties which has been the subject of
litigation.
The division between the jurisdictions which have dealt with
the "trainer insurer" rules is marked by their disagreement as to
whether the regulations impose absolute liability or provide for ir-
rebuttable presumptions, and whether this exercise of the police
power violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution.9
7. State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n., 133 W.Va.
179, 55 S.E.2d 263 (1949). The purpose of the rule was
... to avoid, as far as possible, the use of medicine or drugs
which might affect the normal ability of a horse to run in a race
intended to be conducted under rules of honesty and fairness. In
effecting such a result, in the peculiar circumstances under which
horses are trained and prepared for racing, responsibility for the
condition of a horse when he enters a race must, of necessity, be
placed somewhere. To leave any doubt on that point would be to
make ineffective all efforts at regulation, and all attempts to
assure fairness in horse racing.
Id. at 182, 55 S.E.2d at 269.
8. Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189
P.2d 17 (1948): "The closer the supervision to which the trainer is held,
the more difficult it becomes for anyone to administer a drug to the
horse." Id. at 405, 189 P.2d at 21.
9. The issue has also arisen as to whether the trainer's license is a
property right, hence protected by the fourteenth amendment, or a privi-
lege, not within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. Though
briefly mentioned in several of the cases involving "trainer insurer" rules,
the issue does not seem to be an important factor in determining the
validity or invalidity of the rules.
While there is a division of authority on the matter, the tendency
appears to be that licenses, particularly where they are necessary to the
pursuit of a profession or occupation, are deemed either property rights
or liberties, both of which are protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956): "A State
cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or any other occupation
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 239. The court
added in a footnote:
We need not enter into a discussion of whether the practice of law
is a "right" or "privilege." Regardless of how the State's grant
of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is
sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing
law except for valid reasons.
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY V. IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
The courts which have held the "trainer insurer" rules to be
valid have interpreted them as imposing absolute liability by look-
ing at the language of the rules and applying the "plain meaning
rule."'1  In Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Board,1 ' the
court stated that: "... [t]he import of this rule is to impose strict
liability upon the trainer for the condition of the horse. The
language of the rule can admit of no other conclusion. ' 12 As abso-
lute liability rules they would be rules of substantive law13 and
within the exercise of the state's police powers.
The courts which have held the "trainer insurer" rules to be
invalid have interpreted them as providing for irrebuttable pre-
sumptions 4 by looking at the effect of the rules.'2
Id.; Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), aff'd on rehearing, 330
F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964):
It is firmly established, of course, that the state has the right to
regulate or prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquor in the valid exer-
cise of its police power, but this is something quite different from
a right to act arbitrarily and capriciously. Merely calling a liquor
license a privilege does not free the municipal authorities from
the due process requirements in licensing and allow them to exer-
cise uncontrolled discretion.
Id. at 609; Lewis v. Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 356 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1967): "Liberty in-
cludes the right to pursue a lawful occupation. To prevent this without
due process is to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." Id. at 386.
10. Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924): The words of the
statute being clear ". . . [the court's] duty is simply to enforce the law as
it is written, unless clearly unconstitutional." Id. at 446.
11. 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189 P.2d 17 (1948).
12. Id. at 405, 189 P.2d 21. To leave no doubt in the mind of the reader,
the court went on to state:
Rule 313 may not be deemed to establish a conclusive presumption
to the effect that evidence of the presence of a drug in a horse is
proof that the trainer drugged the horse. By express language
the rule imposes strict liability for the condition of the horse. Fault
in the sense of actual administration of the drug or negligent care
by the trainer is neither the basis nor an element of liability. It
may not be inserted into the case by subtle hypothesis. Whether
the trainer drugged the horse or knew that it was drugged, or
was negligent in not properly seeing that the horse was not
drugged are not elements of liability.
Id.
13. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475 (1959):
As a general rule, laws which fix duties, establish rights and re-
sponsibilities among and for persons, natural or otherwise, are"substantive laws" in character, while those which merely prescribe
the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be exer-
cised and enforced in a court are procedural laws.
Id. at 397, 157 N.E.2d at 478; accord, State v. Augustine, 197 Kan. 207, 210,
416 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1966).
14. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Williams, 377 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1967):
A "conclusive presumption" of law is one which is final and
irrebuttable, an inference which must be drawn from proof of
given facts, and which no evidence, however strong, can overcome.
Id. at 394.
15. State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 159 Fla. 165, 31 So. 627 (1947). The
court looked at Rule 117 which makes the trainer an absolute insurer, in
Notes
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Wigmore,16 in his treatise on evidence, is of the opinion that
there cannot, in strictness, be such a thing as a conclusive pre-
sumption. The rule, which is purportedly a conclusive presump-
tion, really provides that, where the first fact is shown to exist
(e.g., drugs in the horses system), the existence of the second fact
(e.g., that the trainer administered or negligently allowed to be
administered a drug) is immaterial for the purpose of the propo-
nent's case (e.g., violation of the "trainer insurer" rule). The rule
is not one apportioning the burden of persuasion nor is it one vary-
ing the duty of coming forward with the evidence. It is a rule
of substantive law, and the legislature, in its control over the
substantive law, is still limited by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
1 7
Therefore, whether the statute is interpreted as imposing abso-
lute liability or as providing for an irrebuttable presumption, it is
a rule of substantive law. Hence, the issue remains whether the
"trainer insurer" rules are a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
THE POLICE POWER AND DuE PROCESS
The police power is the least limitable of the powers of govern-
ment1 8 and is the broadest in scope of any field of governmental
activity.' 9 An exact definition or limitation of the police power
is impossible to give.20 The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated that the police power is "neither abstractly nor histori-
cally capable of definition."'" Various attempts have been made at
framing a definition of the police power 22 but these definitions
pari-materia with Rule 109 which states:
No person shall administer, or permit to be administered in any
manner whatsoever, internally or externally, to any horse, entered
or to be entered in a race, any stimulant, depressant, hypnotic nor
narcotic drug, of any kind or description, prior to a race or
workout.
Id. at 169, 31 So. 2d at 631. The court then concluded:
In this regard Rule 117 in effect provides that proof of the fact
that a horse entered in a race has been administered a drug shall
constitute irrebuttable evidence that the trainer has violated
Rule 109. This is why Rule 117 violates the due process clause
of both our state and federal constitutions.
Id.
16. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVInENcE (3d ed. 1940).
17. Id. § 2492 at 292, § 1354 at 718.
18. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946).
19. State v. McDonald, 160 Wis. 21, 59, 151 N.W. 331, 369 (1915).
20. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873).
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
22. Gcldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("time-tested
have been broad and difficult to apply. Because of the difficulties
encountered in framing a definite rule which would be applicable
in all cases, it would be much simpler to determine whether a
particular case comes within the scope of the police power.
2 3
The police power is not unlimited, 24 but its limitations have
never been drawn with exactness. 25 The Supreme Court has gen-
erally refrained from announcing any specific criteria to be ap-
plied to a particular case except for substituting the standard of
"reasonableness. '26 This requirement of reasonableness is a mani-
festation of the due process requirement.27 The standard of rea-
sonableness is of extreme importance 28 because the test of the reg-
ulation's constitutionality is not whether the regulation imposes
any restrictions on constitutionally protected rights, but whether
the restrictions imposed are reasonable.29
While there is no exact test to determine when a restriction
is unreasonable, 0 the general rule is that in order for a police
measure to be reasonable, "the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary and appropriate for the accomplishment of the legitimate
objects falling within the scope of the power."31 A regulation is
not necessarily unreasonable because it results in inconvenience or
loss to an individual, 32 nor because some of the objects affected by
it may be wholly innocent." The test of reasonableness "involves
consideration of the nature of the right asserted by the individual
and the extent that it is necessary to restrict the assertion of the
conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests"); Gil-
christ Drug Co. v. Birmingham, 234 Ala. 204, 207, 174 So. 609, 612 (1937)
("the power to prevent, an anticipation of danger to come"); Ex Parte
Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 640, 226 P. 914, 921 (1943) ("the power inherent
in the state to prescribe, within limits of the state and federal constitu-
tions, reasonable regulations to preserve the public order, health, safety
and morals"); State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 571, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919
(1943) ("the power to add to the general public convenience, prosperity
and welfare").
23. Booth v. Indiana, 237 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897).
24. Stepp v. State, 202 Miss. 725, 726, 32 So. 2d 447, 448 (1947); State
v. Henry, 37 N.M. 536, 540, 25 P.2d 204, 208 (1933).
25. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
26. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
27. Hoff v. State, 39 Del. 134, 140, 197 A. 75, 81 (1938).
28. McCoy v. York, 193 S.C. 390, 393, 8 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1940); Mehlos
v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 593, 146 N.W. 882, 884 (1914).
29. Baton Rouge v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 188, 75 So. 2d 239, 241
(1954).
30. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
233 Ind. 83, 86, 117 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1954).
31. Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 444 (1939). Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S 502, 525 (1934); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 196 Cal. 477,
484, 234 P. 381, 388 (1925), error dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1925).
32. Henson v. Chicago, 451 Ill. 206, 210, 114 N.E.2d 778, 782 (1953);
Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 209, 124 N.E. 416, 419 (1919)
33. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946).
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right in the interest of the public.
'34
REASONABLENESS
Absolute liability is imposed by the state under its police
power and hence is subject to the reasonableness test. To determine
whether the "trainer insurer" regulations are reasonable, it will
be necessary to examine analogous cases to find what criteria the
courts used in determining that the regulations were reasonable.
Absolute liability has been imposed in the area of tort law and in
the area of the law termed "public welfare regulations."3 5 In the
cases which have dealt with absolute liability statutes and regula-
tions, four criteria from which the courts determined that the
regulations were reasonable become apparent: respondeat supe-
rior,3 6 control of activity causing the harm, 37 ability to bear the
loss, 38 and the deterrent effect of the regulation. 9
Respondeat Superior
Cases which uphold absolute liability statutes on the basis of
respondeat superior40 involve an employer-employee relationship
34. Jones v. Board of Control, 131 So. 2d 713, 717 (Fla. 1961).
35. F. SAYRE, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. R-v. 55, 73 (1933),
roughly classifies the public welfare offenses as (1) illegal sales of intoxi-
cating liquors, (2) sales of impure or adulterated foods, (3) sales of mis-
branded articles, (4) violations of anti-narcotics acts, (5) criminal nui-
sances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor vehicle
laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety,
health or well being of the community.
36. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 175 P.2d 832
(1946); Mantzoros v. Board of Equalization, 87 Cal. App. 140, 196 P.2d
657 (1948); Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E.2d 370 (1946); An-
schutz v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n., 343 Mich. 630, 73 N.W.2d 533
(1955); Mazza v. Cavicchia, 28 N.J. Super. 280, 100 A.2d 550 (1954); Rufo
v. Board of Liquor Control, 130 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio App. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 164 Ohio St. 275, 131 N.E.2d 390 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959); Scialo v. Smith, 210 A.2d 595
(R.I. 1965).
37. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Jones v. Brim,
165 U.S. 180 (1897); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896);
United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1943); Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928); Colton v. Onderdonk, 69
Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886); Goldberg v. Rabuchin, 65 Cal. App. 2d 111, 149
P.2d 961 (1944); Wolfe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St.
643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
38. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582 (1901); Western
Indemnity v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P. 398 (1915).
39. Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
40. Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 216 Md. 69, 139 A.2d 235 (1958):
The rule of "respondeat superior" arises from a relation of principal
between the person charged and the person causing the harm.
In the liquor control cases,41 the criminal short-weight cases, 42 and
the sales of misbranded drug cases, 43 the owner is penalized for
the acts of his employees. The owner has hired the employees, is
making a profit by virtue of their employment, and has an obliga-
tion to maintain an efficient and affirmative supervision of his
business.44 Hence, he should be and has been held responsible for
their acts performed within the scope of their employment, and it
is reasonable that he be so held.
It is submitted that this reasoning is not applicable to the
"trainer insurer" rules. In the first place, the trainer, while pos-
sibly an employer of the jockeys, grooms and others who are
necessary to the operation, is himself an employee of the owner
of the horse. On this basis, it could be argued that the owner,
not the trainer, should be held absolutely liable. The owner does
forfeit his purse, but his right to have his horses entered in races
is not vulnerable to suspension or revocation. Secondly, the train-
er's liability is not limited to the acts or omissions of his em-
ployees, but is extended to include the criminal acts of third per-
sons not subject to his control or supervision. None of the cases
imposing absolute liability dealt with a situation where the harm
was caused by the criminal act of a third party not related to the
person charged in an employer-employee relationship. The court,
in Ex parte Marle y, 45 did indicate that such a situation could con-
ceivably arise, but declined to comment as to the effect such a
situation would have on the regulation.
46
Control of Activity
The control of activity basis for determining the reasonable-
ness of the regulations is found in the cases dealing with regula-
tions concerning ultra-hazardous activities such as blasting,47 oil
and subordinate, and rests upon the powers of control and direction
which the superior has over the subordinate, and applies when
the relation of master and servant, employer and employee, or
principal and agent is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and
the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong at the
time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury
arose.
Id. at 72, 139 P.2d at 238.
41. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Gibbons v. Cannaven,
393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E.2d 370 (1946); Anschutz v. Michigan Liquor Control
Comm'n., 343 Mich. 630, 73 N.W.2d 533 (1955); Mazza v. Cavicchia, 28 N.J.
Super. 280, 100 A.2d 550 (1954); Rufo v. Board of Liquor Control, 120
N.E.2d 374 (Ohio App. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 164 Ohio St. 275, 131
N.E.2d 390 (1955); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825
(1959); Scialo v. Smith, 210 A.2d 595 (R.I. 1965).
42. Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 175 P.2d 832 (1946).
43. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
44. Scialo v. Smith, 210 A.2d 595, 598 (R.I. 1965).
45. Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 175 P.2d 832 (1946).
46. Id. at 529, 175 P.2d at 836.
47. Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886).
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well drilling,4 8 animals, 49 railroad fires,50 and adulterated food and
drugs.5 1 In these situations, the person charged has control over
the activity causing the harm,5 2 and the potential dangers which
might result from the activity itself are so great that the person
is deemed to be "acting at his peril." 53 It could be argued that
the trainer has control over the horse, but the horse is not causing
the harm. The harm is the administering of the drug to the
horse. The racing of the horse is not of itself an activity which
has the potential for harm as is blasting, keeping or driving ani-
mals, and oil well drilling. However, neither is the sale of food
an activity which has potential for harm, unless the food is adul-
terated, and these are activities upon which absolute liability has
been imposed.
The courts that have passed on the food and drug regulations
have limited their discussions to the lack of scienter-even though
the defendant didn't and couldn't know that the food or drug
was adulterated, he was still liable for prosecution. The "trainer
insurer" rules could be read in the same way, that is, a trainer
who enters a drugged horse in a race is liable, whether he knows
the horse has been drugged or not. However, even if the "trainer
insurer" rules were read in this manner, there are still obvious
distinctions between them and the food and drug regulations. In
the latter cases, the harm to the public is grave, with the possible
results being serious injury or death; in the former, the harm
to the public is merely pecuniary and the harm which results for
the trainer is potentially disastrous. The public requires food for
survival and drugs for healing. Except for a small portion of the
population which raises and grows its own food, the public must
rely on the food processors and distributors and the drug manu-
facturers. No such need is forced on the wagering public. To
48. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
49. Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180 (1897); Goldberg v. Rabuchin, 65
Cal. App. 2d 111, 149 P.2d 961 (1944).
50. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896).
51. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States
v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1943); Wolfe v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
52. Green v. General Petroleum Corp,, 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928):
Where an injury arises out of, or is caused directly and proxi-
mately by the contemplated act or thing in question, without the
interposition of any external or independent agency which was not
or could not be foreseen, there is an absolute liability for the
consequential damages, regardless of any element of negligence
either in doing the act or in the construction, use, or maintenance
of that object or instrumentality that may have caused the injury.
Id. at 331, 270 P. at 955.
53. People v. Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774, 782, 151 P.2d 517, 521 (1944).
them, it is generally recreation, and they are taking a gamble by
wagering in the first place. The number of people who would in-
tentionally adulterate food and drugs is practically nil, with the
possible exception of an unscrupulous competitor, while the num-
ber of people who would intentionally drug a horse could be as
many as there are persons wagering on the outcome of the race.
None of the cases which based the reasonableness of the regula-
tion on the control of the activity dealt with a situation in which
the act which caused the harm was committed intentionally by a
third person. The possibility of such an act, however, has arisen
in a number of the "trainer insurer" cases.
54
Ability to Bear Loss
The ability to bear the loss principle is peculiar to the tort field
of absolute liability, such as a railroad's liability for injury to pas-
sengers55 and workmen's compensation acts.5 6 In Chicago R.I. &
Pac. Ry. v. Zernecke,57 the court upheld a statute creating absolute
liability for the death or injury of a railroad passenger. The rail-
road's contention that the injuries resulted from a wreck caused
by vandals who had torn up the track was to no avail.58 The
analogy of this statute with the "trainer insurer" statute appears
on its face to be valid and undistinguishable since the court held
the railroad liable for the acts of third parties not related to the
railroad. This statute was designed, however, to give the injured
party a remedy for the injury suffered-it is remedial, not penal. 59
The railroad is a large company carrying passengers for a profit.
The individual passenger pays a fee for the service rendered by the
railroad. The company cannot only bear the loss better than the
passenger, but it can protect itself with insurance, and it can spread
the loss among the users of the railroad by including in its ticket
rates the cost of insurance. In the case of the trainer, the loss falls
upon a large number of individuals, while the liability is imposed
upon the trainer, and there is no way the trainer can insure
against or spread his loss. In the railroad case, the loss to the in-
dividual is great, while the comparative loss to the railroad is
minor. In the trainer's case, the loss to each member of the betting
public is small in comparison to the loss of livelihood for the
trainer.
54. State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 159 Fla. 165, 31 So. 2d 627 (1947);
Maryland Racing Comm'n. v. McGee, 212 Md. 69, 128 A.2d 419 (1957).
55. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582 (1901).
56. Western Indemnity v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P. 398 (1915).
57. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582 (1901).
58. Id. at 586.
59. Marter v. Repp, 80 N.J.L. 530, 77 A. 1030 (1910):
A "penal" statute is one which enforces a forfeiture or penalty for
transgressing its provisions or doing a thing prohibited. "Penal"
is a much broader term than "criminal" and includes many stat-
utory enforcements of police regulations the violations of which
are in no sense crimes.
Id. at 531, 77 A. at 1031.
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Finally, the purpose of the "trainer insurer" rules, unlike the
statute imposing absolute liability on the railroad, is penal and
not remedial. In most instances, the harm suffered by the wagerers
is non-remedial because a determination that drugs are present in
the horse's system is not usually possible until after the race has
been run and the pari-mutuel winners paid offY0 The purpose of
the "trainer insurer" rules is to protect the interests of the wager-
ing public by preventing the harm rather than compensating them
after the injury has occurred.
Deterrent Effect
The reliance on the deterrent effect for finding the absolute
liability regulations to be reasonable runs through all the cases,
whether they be in the area of tort liability or public welfare regu-
lations. In Chicago v. Sturges, 1 the court held valid a statute
imposing absolute liability on a city for damages caused by riots,
stating:
The imposition of absolute liability upon the commun-
ity when property is destroyed through the violence of a
mob is not, therefore, an unusual police regulation.
Neither is it arbitrary, as not resting upon reasonable
grounds of policy. Such a regulation has a tendency to
deter the lawless, since the sufferer must be compensated
by a tax burden which will fall upon all property, includ-
ing that of the evil-doers as members of the community.
It is likewise calculated to stimulate the exertions of
the indifferent and the law-abiding to avoid the falling
of a burden which they must share with the lawless.
6 2
The employer will tend to be deterred from not exercising due
care in the employment and supervision of his employees; the ani-
mal owner will tend to be deterred from carelessness in the control
of his animals; the oil well driller will tend to be deterred from
carelessness in drilling his wells; the food and drug processors and
manufacturers will tend to be deterred from slipshod practices.
However, the deterrent theory has no application to that portion
of the "trainer insurer" regulations which extend the liability of
the trainer to the acts of third parties. Also, while it is true that
the trainer will be deterred from himself administering drugs to
his horse, from negligently and carelessly hiring and supervising
employees, and from negligently and carelessly guarding his horse
60. Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 405, 189
P.2d 17, 21 (1948).
61. 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
62. Id. at 314.
to prevent others from administering drugs to it, this same deter-
rent effect could be obtained from a regulation based on fault. As
the Brennan court stated,
...there is still no assurance that the rule in its operation
offers any more protection than does one based upon fault,
or that it has a real and substantial relation to the pro-
tection of the track patrons against fraud or deceit. The
thought of the "absolute insurer" provisions is presumably
to induce the trainer to take precautions against a tamper-
ing with the horse. But this is no more than he would do
anyway, under penalty provisions based on traditional prin-
ciples of fairness, since the consequences of failing to
take precautions would be the same. It would seem that
the only applications of the rule which would not be
equally covered by one based on fault would be to situ-
ations which the trainer could not have prevented any-
way. We see little if any tendency in penalty-without-
fault provisions to reduce the frequency of the crime.6 3
NECESSITY
Even though the absolute liability imposed by the "trainerin-
surer" rules might be found to be reasonable on the basis of one
or more of the preceding criteria, there remains the test of whether
the regulation is necessary to attain the desired result. In 1911,
the United States Supreme Court cautioned that ". . . the means
devised to effect the purpose should not go beyond the necessities
of the case.' 64  In recent years, courts have turned this warning
into a limitation on the police power, by stating that "the means
cannot sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedom," 65 ". . . means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties cannot be pursued when the end can be
more narrowly achieved, ' 66 and that ". . the means must not
interfere with private rights beyond the necessities of the situa-
tion. ' 67 As a result of this necessity limitation, courts have struck
down statutes when an alternative, less drastic means was available
to achieve the same end. In Martin v. Struthers,6" the court held
invalid an ordinance forbidding any person to summon to the door
the occupants of any residence for the purpose of delivering hand-
63. Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 42 Ill. 2d 352, 355, 247 N.E.2d 881,
884 (1969).
64. House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911).
65. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
66. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951); American Communications
Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560
(1947); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937).
67. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Nolden v.
East Cleveland City Comm'n., 12 Ohio Misc. 205, 209, 232 N.E.2d 421, 425
(1966).
68. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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bills or circulars. This ordinance had as its purpose the protection
of the householders from annoyance, including intrusion upon the
hours of rest, and the prevention of crime. The court stated that
there were ". . . other traditional legal methods of achieving the
same end," and on that basis held the ordinance to be invalid.6 9
In Weaver v. Palmer Brothers,70 the court invalidated a statute
regulating the manufacture of mattresses where a reasonable al-
ternative method entailing less deprivation was available. 71 In
Talley v. California,72 the court held invalid an ordinance prohib-
iting the distribution of handbills because the breadth of its appli-
cation went far beyond what was necessary to achieve a legitimate
governmental purpose.
73
While these regulations dealt with situations quite different
from the horse trainer situation, the principle is the same. The
"trainer insurer" rules go beyond what is necessary to protect the
racing public, and alternative methods are available to achieve the
same end. Regulations which would hold the trainer liable for
guilt or negligence would be sufficient to protect the wagering
public's interest, particularly when there are statutes which make
it a felony to administer drugs to race horses with the intent to
affect their performance in a race.74 Not only is the public protected
from fraud and deceit by the trainer and his employees, but it is
also protected from fraud and deceit by any other person who
attempts to control the outcome of the race.
A regulation based on fault would also provide the horse
trainer with certain constitutional rights deprived him by a statute
imposing absolute liability. One of the requirements of due process
is that the person charged be afforded a hearing. 75 The trainer
69. Id. at 146-49.
70. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
71. Id. at 415; accord, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
72. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
73. Id. at 62; accord, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
74. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 37(h) (1) (1966):
1. Whoever administers or conspires to administer to any horse
a drug or stimulant or depressant internally, externally or by
hypodermic method in a race or prior thereto, or
2. Whoever knowingly enters any horse in any race within a
period of 24 hours after any hypnotic or narcotic or stimulant or
depressant has been administered to such horse either internally
or externally, or by hypodermic method, for the purpose of
increasing or retarding the speed of such horse, is guilty of a fel-
ony and punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars ($5000), or by imprisonment in a State prison or a county
jail for not less than one nor more than two years or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
75. Chicago v. Sturges, 322 U.S. 313 (1949); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1937).
may be afforded a hearing under the "trainer insurer" rules, but
these hearings are, in effect, mere forms to reach a predetermined
result. A regulation based on fault would still make the trainer
liable for his own acts, whether they consisted of intentional or
negligent administration of the drug, or intentional or negligent
care of the horse which would allow another to administer the
drug. However, at the same time it would give the trainer the
benefit of an adversary hearing at which he could introduce evi-
dence proving that the act was committed by a third party in
spite of the care and diligence exercised by the trainer.
The proponents of the "trainer insurer" rules maintain that to
make the trainer liable only for guilt or negligence would leave
a wide area unprotected,7 6 and they point out the difficulty of
proving negligence or guilt.77 The area is protected by those stat-
utes making it a felony to administer a drug to a horse.78 That
a problem of proof exists, however, cannot be denied; but as Judge
Carter points out in his dissent in Sandstrom v. California Horse
Racing Board,79 "this is a matter of weighing expediency against
justice."8 0  A similar argument regarding difficulty of proof was
made in Smith v. California.81 The court answered:
We might observe that it has been some time now
since the law viewed itself as impotent to explore the
actual state of a man's mind. Eyewitness testimony of a
bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary
element in proving his awareness of its contents. The
circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware
of what a book contained, despite his denial.8 2
The problem of proof is burdensome, but under our system of
justice, wherein a man is presumed innocent until proven guilty,
it is necessarily cast upon the state. To deprive a man of his con-
stitutional rights by legislatively dispensing with the requirement
76. Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189
P.2d 17 (1948):
Should responsibility be imposed only for actual guilty partici-
pation or culpable negligence ... there would exist a possible
field of activity beyond the affirmative protection thereby af-
forded to the patrons of the pari-mutuel system.
Id. at 407, 189 P.2d at 23; Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n., 3 Ohio App.
2d 423, 426, 210 N.E.2d 730, 733 (1965).
77. Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n., 3 Ohio App. 2d 423, 210 N.E.2d
730 (1965):
Manifestly, it would be almost impossible to prove guilty knowl-
edge or intent in cases of this kind, and the futility of prosecutions
under a rule requiring probative evidence or guilty knowledge and
intent would eventually leave the public interest and welfare to
the mercy of the unscrupulous.
Id. at 426, 210 N.E.2d at 733.
78. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 37(h) (1) (1966).
79. Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189
P.2d 17 (1948).
80. Id. at 413, 189 P.2d at 29 (dissenting opinion).
81. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
82. Id. at 154.
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of proof of fault seems unconscionable. As the Brennan court
points out, "[a]dministrative convenience is not a constitutional
substitute for the rights of individuals.""3
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that absolute insurer statutes and regulations,
whether they be labeled as strict liability or irrebuttable presump-
tion, violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because they are arbitrary and unreasonable. They should be con-
sidered arbitrary and unreasonable because they go beyond what
is necessary to protect the interests of the public and because al-
ternative methods of attaining the desired end, methods which will
not deprive the trainer of his rights, are available.
A regulation based on guilt or negligence is sufficient to afford
the public the protection it needs. The only advantage the "trainer
insurer" regulations have over regulations based on fault is the
elimination of the proof requirement, and this advantage is not a
sufficient basis to deprive the trainer of his rights.
It should be incumbent upon the state, as a beneficiary of the
fruits of horse racing, to take a more active part in supervising
and securing the activities at the racetrack, rather than pass to
this burden to the individual trainer.
THOMAS COSTA
• 83. Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 42 Ill. 2d 352, 355, 247 N.E.2d 881,
884 (1969).
